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‘Popular Constitutional Amendment’: Referendums and Constitutional Change in 
Canada and the United Kingdom 
Stephen Tierney, University of Edinburgh1 
Abstract 
The referendum has been sparingly used at national level in both the UK, where the only 
national referendums were held in 1975 and 2011, and Canada where the referendum on the 
1992 draft Charlottetown Accord is the only recent example. Referendums are in fact more 
common at the provincial/sub-state level where the dramatic issue of secession has been 
bound up with direct democracy in each country.  
The article argues that referendums on secession are in some sense in a category of their own 
for the way in which they present the referendum as an expression of constituent power. It 
compares the sovereignty referendums held in Quebec, particularly that in 1995, with the 
Scottish independence referendum of 2014. Constitutional silence in both countries on the 
issue of secession has meant that the referendum enters the ‘amendment’ process as a wild 
card, one which required the Supreme Court of Canada to confront the fundamental values of 
the constitution of Canada and which has led the UK Government to concede the principle of 
secession in relation to Scotland.  
But another key issue is referendum due process. The constituent nature of secession 
referendums also establishes a challenge to those advocating the use of such referendums to 
prove that they satisfy fundamental democratic credentials. Here the Scottish independence 
referendum seems to offer lessons to Canada on good practice. But in a more prosaic context 
the Canadian referendum experience is also instructive to the UK and elsewhere for the 
experiments in deliberative democracy which preceded the referendums on electoral reform 
in British Columbia and Ontario. The article compares the benefits of these provincial 
citizens’ assembly processes with the much more ‘top-down’ referendum on electoral reform 
in the UK in 2011.  
In both countries the referendum is a dramatic outlier in the constitutional amendment 
process. It brings citizens to the front and centre of constitutional decision-making. For this 
reason, efforts within Canada to equip citizens with the deliberative tools necessary to take 
these fundamental decisions are innovative and instructive. It may be that referendums are in 
fact better used in issues of the most fundamental constitutional importance, but it is also in 
these events that the full engagement of citizens, which has been bravely attempted at the 
Canadian provincial level, would appear to be most acutely needed.---------------------- 
1. Introduction 
                                                          
1 Stephen Tierney is Professor of Constitutional Theory, Director of the Edinburgh Centre for Constitutional 
Law and Legal Adviser to the House of Lords Constitution Committee. He was British Academy/Leverhulme 
Senior Research Fellow 2008-2009, leading to the monograph Constitutional Referendums: The Theory and 
Practice of Republican Deliberation (Oxford: OUP, 2012), and ESRC Senior Research Fellow 2013-2014, 
studying the democratic credentials of the Scottish independence referendum.  
He served as independent adviser to the Scottish Government on the technical aspects of the independence 
referendum in 2012, and in January 2013 was appointed constitutional adviser to the Scottish Parliament’s 
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In one sense it is odd even to talk about amendment in the context of the United Kingdom 
constitution. Lacking codified form the constitution is ‘amended’ by way of ordinary 
legislation passed by the Westminster Parliament. Until 1982 of course this was technically 
how the constitution of Canada was also amended: through modifications to the British North 
America Act 1867, effected by the Westminster Parliament consequent upon an address by 
the federal government on behalf of both Houses of the Canadian Parliament. Not until 
patriation and the passage of the Canada Act 1982 by the UK Parliament was the amending 
formula brought home fully to Canada, and codified in detail in the Constitution Act 1982.2 
The elaborate and complex amendment mechanism within the Constitution Act provides for a 
range of processes depending upon the issue at stake. This level of detail and the fact of its 
entrenchment within a higher order written constitution moved Canada to a position in which 
its model of amendment now contrasts sharply with that of the UK where the principle of 
parliamentary sovereignty remains the foundational rule of recognition. 
The issue of constitutional amendment appears therefore to be an unlikely subject upon 
which to look for points of comparison between the two countries. One area, however, which 
does bear useful evaluation is the way in which the referendum has emerged as a significant 
player in constitutional affairs both at national and regional levels in each country and the 
role it has played in offering significant constitutional change and in engaging citizens more 
directly in constitutional processes. The Canadian constitution contains no provision on 
referendums. This silence has been taken to permit rather than prohibit referendums. Without 
a codified form the constitution of the United Kingdom is similarly ‘silent’ on the 
permissibility of referendums, but again for an omnipotent parliament the absence of any 
constitutional provision is by logic permissive. The use of the referendum in both countries 
has been very sparing but it would seem that the trend, insofar as one exists, is towards a 
greater reliance on direct democracy in processes of constitutional change, at both state and 
sub-state levels. 
There have only been three ‘national’ referendums in Canada: on prohibition in 1898, on 
conscription in 1942, and on the draft Charlottetown Accord in 1992. The real growth in 
referendum usage has been at the provincial level, as Table 1 (Appendix 1) demonstrates. 
Notably, a number of provinces have adopted statutes which require that amendments to the 
Canadian constitution be subject to a provincial referendum.3 
A similar pattern emerges in the United Kingdom, where there have only been two national 
referendums – on membership of the European Communities in 1975 and on the electoral 
system in 2011, and where, as Table 2 (Appendix 2) shows, the vast majority of referendums 
have involved sub-state territories, in particular over the issue of devolving powers to sub-
state territories.  
This article explores how the referendum, for all that its use remains sporadic, enters the 
amendment process as something of an outlier, not quite fitting within generally accepted 
understandings of the representative nature of democracy within both Canada and the UK, 
and therefore unsettling established assumptions both about how constitutional change should 
be brought about, and, more particularly, about the proper role for citizens in these processes. 
The article argues first (Part 2) that referendums used for the most fundamental constitutional 
                                                          
2 The Constitution Act, 1982, Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11, sections 38-49. 
3 For example, (British Columbia) Constitutional Amendment Approval Act RSBC 1996, c 67; (Alberta) 
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decisions are in some sense in a category of their own; in the Canadian and UK cases this has 
involved the issue of secession. In each we will see how the use of direct democracy to 
challenge the very existence of the state in its current form has proved so unsettling to 
established constitutional thinking. This type of referendum, which poses such a threat to the 
constitutional authority of the state itself, is at the level of constitutional theory categorically 
different from referendums that are more clearly within the constitution, such as those on 
electoral reform. 
But in Part 3 we will explore how the constituent nature of secession referendums also 
establishes a challenge to those advocating the use of such referendums to prove that they 
satisfy fundamental democratic credentials. The referendum enjoys a bad name in political 
theory and a number of valid objections need to be overcome if the referendum is to be a 
truly valid instrument with which to effect the most fundamental forms of constitutional 
change. Here the Scottish independence referendum seems to offer lessons to Canada on 
good practice.  
More broadly, whether posing constituent or more prosaic constitutional questions, the 
referendum challenges us to think about the role of the citizen both as bearer of constitutional 
authority, and as feasible and informed author of constitutional change, able to engage in a 
deliberative way in processes of fundamental and even complex constitutional change. And 
in this light in Part 4 we will turn to the constituent assembly processes in British Columbia 
and Ontario, exploring these innovative projects which sought to inject direct popular 
authorship into the provincial constitutional amendment process. Electoral reform is a far less 
fundamental issue than secession, and as such it can be much harder both to gain public 
interest in the issue, develop public knowledge and to mobilise participation. Here we will 
contrast the relative success of the Canadian experience with the UK referendum on electoral 
reform held in 2011 which  is generally agreed failed entirely to stimulate public engagement. 
This then is the challenge for direct democracy in Canada and the UK, to produce the level of 
citizen interest and engagement upon which its legitimacy depends. 
 
2. Quebec Secession Reference and the Scottish Independence Referendum: direct 
democracy as vehicle for constituent power 
The most dramatic examples in Canadian history of referendums as conduits of constituent 
power were of course those held in Quebec in 1980 and 1995. It was in relation to these 
events that the silence within the Canadian constitution on the role of the referendum raised 
the deeply unsettling question: could secession be effected by way of a provincial referendum 
perhaps even supplanting the amendment process set out in the written constitution of 
Canada? The authority of provinces to stage referendums was well established in Canadian 
constitutional law.4  Therefore, when after the 1995 referendum the federal government 
brought a reference before the Supreme Court of Canada, the key focus of the questions 
asked was not to the lawfulness of a referendum per se, even on the issue of secession, but the 
effect of such a referendum in domestic and international law.5     
                                                          
4 Todd Donovan, ‘Referendums and Initiative in North America’ in Matt Qvortrup, Referendums around the 
world: the continued growth of direct democracy (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), 122 at 132-135. 
5 Reference Re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217. 
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The three questions asked are of course very familiar.6 
The Court took the view that international law on secession did not apply to the situation of 
Quebec because international law ‘does not specifically grant component parts of sovereign 
states the legal right to secede unilaterally from their “parent” state.’7 This also rendered the 
third question – on the hierarchy of domestic and international law in the event of a conflict 
between the two - redundant. The Court therefore focused upon the first question: whether or 
not Quebec could secede from Canada unilaterally under the Constitution of Canada. In the 
end, this led to a subtle and complex opinion by the Court which has helped, indirectly, to 
articulate the role which a referendum on secession can play in instigating the process of 
constitutional amendment, and on the limitations of the formal amendment process itself.8 
The Court took the view that there is no unilateral right for Quebec to secede from Canada. 
This could have been the end of the matter. It had been widely assumed that the Constitution 
Act 1982 sections 38-49 set out a conclusive statement of the processes by which 
constitutional change can be instigated and effected. And the Court seemed to support this 
when it confirmed that even in the event of a referendum in Quebec resulting in a clear vote 
for secession, the regular amendment process would require to be followed: ‘The secession of 
a province from Canada must be considered, in legal terms, to require an amendment to the 
Constitution, which perforce requires negotiation.’9 In this context ‘an expression of the 
democratic will of the people of a province’ would confer legitimacy on the efforts of a 
province ‘to initiate the Constitution's amendment process in order to secede by constitutional 
means.’10  
It would appear from these passages that a vote for secession which met the other criteria the 
court laid down (‘free of ambiguity both in terms of the question asked and in terms of the 
support it achieves’11) would simply give Quebec the right to initiate the amendment process. 
By logic it would of course then be open to the other provinces not to agree to such an 
amendment and therefore to refuse to sanction the secession of Quebec by way of formal 
constitutional amendment.  
It is notable however that the Court did not stop here. Instead it proceeded to qualify 
in crucial ways what at first seemed to be an affirmation of constitutional orthodoxy. 
                                                          
6 Reference Re Secession of Quebec, preamble. 
7 Reference Re Secession of Quebec, para 111. 
8 There is a voluminous literature on the Secession Reference. An extensive list is offered by David Haljan in D. 
Haljan, Constitutionalising  Secession (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2014), 300, fn 3. 
 
 
 
 
9 Reference Re Secession of Quebec, para 84. 
10 Reference Re Secession of Quebec, para 87. 
11 Reference Re Secession of Quebec, para 87. 
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The way in which the Court envisaged the referendum interacting with the 
constitutional amendment process is intriguing. The first step the Court takes is to 
suggest that in the event of an unambiguous vote for secession Quebec’s partners in 
Confederation would have an obligation ‘to acknowledge and respect that expression 
of democratic will by entering into negotiations and conducting them in accordance 
with the underlying constitutional principles already discussed.’12 In other words, it is 
not simply the case that Quebec would request negotiations towards a constitutional 
amendment and the other provinces could flatly refuse to negotiate. Instead the Court 
arrives at a duty on the part of Quebec’s ‘partners in confederation’ to negotiate in 
order to respect the will of the majority of Quebecers to secede. This does not mean 
that secession is a fait accompli, flowing simply from a Yes vote on secession. As the 
Court stated: ‘No negotiations could be effective if their ultimate outcome, secession, 
is cast as an absolute legal entitlement based upon an obligation to give effect to that 
act of secession in the Constitution’.13 But on the other hand it could not accept either 
that ‘a clear expression of self-determination by the people of Quebec would impose 
no obligations upon the other provinces or the federal government’. ‘The continued 
existence and operation of the Canadian constitutional order cannot remain indifferent 
to the clear expression of a clear majority of Quebecers that they no longer wish to 
remain in Canada.’ This would amount to the assertion that other constitutionally 
recognized principles necessarily trump the clearly expressed democratic will of the 
people of  Quebec. Such a proposition fails to give sufficient weight to the underlying 
constitutional principles that must inform the amendment process, including the 
principles of democracy and federalism. The rights of other provinces and the federal 
government cannot deny the right of the government of Quebec to pursue secession, 
should a clear majority of the people of Quebec choose that goal, so long as in doing 
so, Quebec respects the rights of others.  ’14 
This is a remarkable statement. It does not expressly state that Quebec has the right to secede 
from Canada but this is at the very least a plausible implication of what it does say. To effect 
secession Quebec would need to negotiate in good faith and conclude the process by way of a 
constitutional amendment, but it is arguably a right to secede nonetheless; Quebec’s partners 
in confederation have a legal duty to negotiate in good faith towards this outcome. 
There is of course nothing stated in the text of the Constitution Act 1982 which tells the 
federal government or the provinces that they have any of these legal duties. Instead this is in 
effect a judicially-constructed constitutional innovation. To make this move the Court looks 
beyond the text of the written constitution, giving considerable importance to ‘unwritten’ or 
underlying principles ‘animating the whole of the Constitution’.15 In the Court’s view there 
are four ‘fundamental and organizing principles of the Constitution’ which are relevant to 
addressing the question of secession: ‘federalism; democracy; constitutionalism and the rule 
of law; and respect for minorities.’16 These ‘defining’ principles function in symbiosis: ‘No 
single principle can be defined in isolation from the others, nor does any one principle trump 
                                                          
12 Reference Re Secession of Quebec, para 88. 
13 Reference Re Secession of Quebec, para 91. 
14 Reference Re Secession of Quebec, para 92 (emphasis added).  
15 Reference Re Secession of Quebec, Preamble. 
16 Reference Re Secession of Quebec, para 32. 
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or exclude the operation of any other.’17 And in normative terms these principles are ascribed 
considerable significance. They are of interpretive value18 of course, as they are in many 
constitutions, but beyond this the Court had earlier found that these principles could be used 
to fill gaps ‘in the express terms of the constitutional text.’19 Elaborating upon this conclusion 
the Court tells us that these principles ‘inform and sustain the constitutional text:  they are the 
vital unstated assumptions upon which the text is based.’20 It is in this context that the Court 
takes its most dramatic step by declaring that these principles ‘are not merely descriptive, but 
are also invested with a powerful normative force, and are binding upon both courts and 
governments’.21 It is with this status in mind that we must understand the court’s view that 
these principles must in turn ‘inform our overall appreciation of the constitutional rights and 
obligations that would come into play in the event that a clear majority of Quebecers votes on 
a clear question in favour of secession.’22 The obligation to negotiate stems from the 
unwritten principles of the constitution which fill the gaps in the constitution’s text ‘with a 
powerful normative force’ which has the power to bind governments. 
It seems in the end that it is the particular symbolic resonance of the referendum as a 
democratic event that is crucial to this expansive interpretation of the constitution and which 
inspires the Court to take abstract constitutional principles, imbibe them with legally binding 
force, and transubstantiate them into a concrete duty to negotiate towards the secession of 
part of the state. It is significant that the Court justifies this development by declaring that the 
‘Canadian constitutional order cannot remain indifferent to the clear expression of a clear 
majority of Quebecers that they no longer wish to remain in Canada.’ It is highly unlikely 
that the Court would have come to this conclusion based, for example, upon a declaration by 
the National Assembly of Quebec of an intention on the part of the province to secede. It is 
the moral force of direct democracy, of the constituent power of citizens speaking directly, 
that seems crucial to the Court’s attitude. And while the Court insists that none of the four 
principles trumps the others, it is the principle of democracy which, in reference to the 
referendum, is used to force the hand of the other provinces. Of course this does not entirely 
usurp the established pathways of constitutional amendment, which the Court expects should 
be used to effect secession, but it seems that in effect the principle of democracy requires the 
use of the amendment process to give effect to the clearly expressed popular will of 
Quebecers if the other conditions it sets – absence of ambiguity ‘in terms of the question 
asked and in terms of the support it achieves’ - are met.  
 
The referendum has also proved to be disquieting for the United Kingdom in constitutional as 
well as political terms. When in January 2012 the Scottish Government announced its 
                                                          
17 Reference Re Secession of Quebec, para 49. 
18 Reference Re Secession of Quebec, para 52. 
19 Provincial Judges Reference [1997] 3 S.C.R. 3, para. 104: the preamble to the constitution "invites the courts 
to turn those principles into the premises of a constitutional argument that culminates in the filling of gaps in the 
express terms of the constitutional text". This is cited at Reference Re Secession of Quebec, para 53. 
20 Reference Re Secession of Quebec, para 49. 
21 Reference Re Secession of Quebec, para 54. 
22 Reference Re Secession of Quebec, para 2. 
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intention to hold a referendum on independence,23 a dispute immediately erupted over 
whether or not the Scottish Government and Scottish Parliament had the authority to hold a 
referendum at all;24 in other words, an even more fundamental disagreement than had 
prevailed in Canada in 1995.  
Devolution was established for Scotland by the Scotland Act 1998. This act created the 
Scottish Government and Scottish Parliament, but, like the Constitution Act 1982 for Canada, 
it remained silent on the issue of referendums and the power of the Scottish institutions to 
organise direct democracy. One important feature of the Scotland Act however is that it 
embodies a ‘retaining model’ of devolution. Therefore, powers reserved to the Westminster 
Parliament are expressly articulated within the act, with all other powers falling within the 
law-making competence of the Scottish Parliament,25 subject to a general reservation 
declaring that this devolution of legislative authority does not affect the power of the 
Parliament of the United Kingdom to make laws for Scotland.26 By virtue of the retaining 
model, it is widely accepted that the power to hold referendums is not reserved, and is on this 
basis devolved to the Scottish Parliament. But this is only uncontroversial in relation to 
referendums on devolved matters. The principal contention of the UK Government which 
emerged in January 2012, supported also by a number of commentators,27 was that the 
Scottish Parliament has no power to hold referendums, even of a non-binding or advisory 
nature, on reserved matters. The reasoning for this is based upon section 29 of the Scotland 
Act which provides, inter alia, that proposed legislation is outside the competence of the 
Scottish Parliament so far as it ‘relates to reserved matters’.28 Within a list of protected areas 
of the constitution ‘the Union of the Kingdoms of Scotland and England’ is reserved29 and, 
therefore, the argument goes, no referendum relating to the Union can lawfully be organised 
by the Scottish Parliament. 
This seems fairly straightforward, but as in the Quebec Secession Reference argument did not 
end with what seemed to be straightforward constitutional orthodoxy. Section 29 qualifies 
what is meant by ‘relates to reserved matters’ as follows: ‘the question whether a provision of 
an Act of the Scottish Parliament relates to a reserved matter is to be determined… having 
regard (among other things) to its effect in all the circumstances.’30 The Scottish 
                                                          
23 ‘Your Scotland – Your Referendum – A Consultation Document’, Scottish Government white paper, 25 
January 2012 http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Publications/2012/01/1006 
24 ‘Scotland's Constitutional Future’, UK Government Command Paper 8203, January 2012 
http://www.scotlandoffice.gov.uk/scotlandoffice/files/17779-Cm-8203.pdf 
25 Scotland Act 1998, c.46, s.28. 
26 Scotland Act 1998, c.46, s. 28(7). 
27 Aidan O’Neill, ‘We need to talk about the referendum…’, UKSC Blog, 4 November 2011, 
http://ukscblog.com/we-need-to-talk-about-the-referendum/; Adam Tomkins, ‘The Scottish Parliament and the 
Independence Referendum’, UK Constitutional Law Association blog, 12 January 2012, 
http://ukconstitutionallaw.org/2012/01/12/adam-tomkins-the-scottish-parliament-and-the-independence-
referendum/ 
28 Scotland Act 1998, c.46, s.29(2)(b) 
29 Scotland Act 1998, c.46, s.30 and sched 5, Part 1. 
30 Scotland Act 1998, c.46, s.29(3). 
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Government31 and others32 responded to the UK Government position by arguing that a 
plausible case could be made, based upon s.29(3), that the Scottish Parliament does have the 
competence to stage a referendum that is clearly intended to be of an advisory or consultative 
nature only, and that does not purport to give the referendum legally binding effect. In other 
words, an advisory referendum would not ‘relate to’ a reserved matter when, looking at its 
effect in all the circumstances, it is clear that it would not ‘effect’ secession by itself. To 
support this argument the Scottish Government declared that the aim of the referendum was 
to seek ‘the views of people in Scotland on a proposal about the way Scotland is governed’; a 
clear attempt to position the proposed bill as of advisory effect only and hence within 
competence.33 
For a time it appeared as though the UK Government would bring to the United Kingdom 
Supreme Court a challenge to the validity of any referendum bill introduced into the Scottish 
Parliament. But in the end, and to the surprise of many, on 15 October 2012 a deal was 
reached between the two governments in what became known as the Edinburgh Agreement.34 
This provided that the UK Parliament would formally authorise the Scottish Parliament to 
legislate to hold a referendum, thereby avoiding the s.29(3) issue altogether. This Agreement, 
and the associated ‘memorandum of agreement’ which accompanied it, provided that the 
referendum should be organises by the Scottish Parliament and ‘be conducted so as to 
command the confidence of parliaments, governments and people’, and also that it must be 
held before the end of 2014.35This is on the face of it a remarkable concession. In effect the 
UK Government was permitting a referendum to go ahead, which could lead to the break-up 
of the country. It did so despite having a strong legal position with which the lawfulness of 
the referendum could well have been resisted. The referendum here enters constitutional 
thinking in a novel way. In fundamental constitutional referendums, which involve 
instantiations of constituent power, the political claim being advanced is that ‘the people’ 
intervene directly to ‘produce’ sovereign decisions in a way which affirms that legitimate 
democratic authority emanates from popular consent rather than the institutions of state. In 
other words, these processes of direct democracy, although originating within a particular 
legal order, unsettle its assumption of sovereign authority by encapsulating a real world 
manifestation of the notion of the people as ultimate source of legitimate power.36 This calls 
to mind Kalyvas’ distinction between ‘command sovereignty’ and ‘constituent sovereignty’. 
                                                          
31 Andy Bloxham, ‘David Cameron accused of interfering in Scottish independence vote’, The Telegraph, 9 
January 2012, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/politics/david-cameron/9001784/David-Cameron-accused-of-
interfering-in-Scottish-independence-vote.html 
32 Gavin Anderson et al, ‘The Independence Referendum, Legality and the Contested Constitution: Widening 
the Debate’, UK Constitutional Law Association Blog, 31 January 2012 
http://ukconstitutionallaw.org/2012/01/31/gavin-anderson-et-al-the-independence-referendum-legality-and-the-
contested-constitution-widening-the-debate/ 
33 Draft Referendum (Scotland) Bill, Preamble, contained in ‘Your Scotland – Your Referendum – A 
Consultation Document’, op. cit. 
34 Agreement between the United Kingdom Government and the Scottish Government on a referendum on 
independence for Scotland, 15 October 2012 available at: 
http://www.scotland.gov.uk/About/Government/concordats/Referendum-on-independence 
35 This was ratified by secondary legislation: Scotland Act 1998 (Modification of Schedule 5) Order 2013, para 
3. http://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2013/242/made 
36 S. Tierney, ‘Constitutional Referendums: A Theoretical Enquiry’ (2009) 72 Modern Law Review 360-383.  
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The latter, unlike the command sovereign idea of sovereignty as the final word, is concerned 
not with ‘coercive power’ but rather ‘constituting power’, pointing at ‘the collective, 
intersubjective, and impersonal attributes of sovereignty, at its cooperative, public 
dimension.’37 The UK government’s concession of a referendum, and its understanding that 
in political terms the legitimacy of the referendum could not be resisted, is in some sense a 
recognition of this constituent model of sovereignty and its capacity to pluralise the popular 
sources of sovereignty in a plurinational state.38 The UK Government may have had 
command sovereignty on its side, but it took the view that in political terms the constituent 
sovereignty of the Scottish people had to be allowed expression by way of a referendum 
presumably because a nationalist government had been elected to the Scottish Parliament 
with a clear manifesto commitment to stage such a process. 
 
3. Facilitating Deliberation in Constituent Referendums: the UK overcomes 
Canada’s problems? 
The referendum was implicitly recognised both by the Supreme Court of Canada and by the 
UK Government as a legitimate conduit for the expression of popular sovereignty of sub-state 
peoples. But this poses a challenge to the referendum itself to meet the democratic demands 
that come with such constitutional power. Elsewhere I have argued that there are three main 
objections to the referendum in democratic terms. The first is the ‘elite control syndrome’. 
Referendums offer the veneer of popular self-determination but in reality they lend 
themselves by definition to elite control and hence to manipulation by the organisers of the 
referendum. The second criticism is the ‘deliberation deficit’; namely that there is an in-built 
tendency of the referendum process merely to aggregate pre-formed opinions rather than to 
foster meaningful deliberation. In other words, in referendums voters tend to engage 
unreflectively without real deliberation or collective discussion of the issues. A third criticism 
of referendums, which we can call ‘the majoritarian danger’, is that referendums represent a 
model of majoritarian decision-making that imperils the interests of dissenting individuals 
and minorities. For many this is the main complaint about referendums: not only is it a poor 
way of making decisions, it can be deeply dangerous. Referendums usually involve a simple 
50% plus 1 majoritarian model leading to a winner takes all outcome; and in the end, a 
majority may simply vote to harm a minority.39 
  
Despite the force of these criticisms I have argued first, that it is important in levelling such 
criticisms that a markedly different standard is not applied to direct democracy than that 
accorded to representative democracy, which can itself be a crude device for representing a 
                                                          
37 A. Kalyvas, ‘Popular Sovereignty, Democracy and Constituent Power’ (2005) 12 Constellations 223 at 235-
236. 
38 For discussion of pluralist conceptions of constitutional sovereignty, see S. Tierney, Constitutional Law and 
National Pluralism (Oxford: Oxford University Pres, 2004), at 109-117. 
39 S. Tierney, Constitutional Referendums: The Theory and Practice of Republican Deliberation  (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2012), 39-42. 
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plurality of interests,40 and secondly, that it is feasible that these concerns with referendums 
can be overcome but only by way of good process design.41 
But process remains a central source of contention when it comes to constitutional 
referendums, and this is particularly problematic when the stakes are so high, as they are in 
constitutive or secession referendums. Despite the success of the Secession Reference in 
addressing the constituent power issue in a balanced and nuanced way, the issue of secession 
from Canada is still deeply contested, particularly with regard to the proper process by which 
Quebec’s expression of the will to secede can and should be articulated in any future 
referendum. Notably the court was not willing to offer a detailed view on how a referendum 
ought to be organised and what the process should be.42 This led to competing responses by 
the federal Parliament and the National Assembly of Quebec, each seeking to assert process 
rules for any future referendum.43  
The issues which remain to be settled include the nature of the question and the nature of a 
‘clear majority’, and, just as importantly, who has the authority to determine these issues 
definitively. Notably at the national level there is no general law in Canada governing the use 
of referendums. In this regard the Scottish-UK process in 2014 is instructive as to how the 
legitimacy of a referendum, where it is empowered to play a determining role in such a 
fundamental constitutional process, depends greatly upon broad agreement by all sides as to 
the process which ought to be followed. 
Clear Majority in the UK: The dog that has never barked 
Through the Edinburgh Agreement consensus was also reached on a number of the key 
process issues which had proven so divisive in Canada in 1995. Interestingly, the issue of the 
size of majority required to validate a referendum vote for independence was never a topic of 
dispute and was in fact not even mentioned in the Edinburgh Agreement; it was implicitly 
accepted that 50% plus one of those voting would decide the referendum.  
This follows an established pattern that any referendum in the United Kingdom will be settled 
by a simple majority of those voting. The only deviations from this norm came with the 
referendums on devolution held in Scotland and Wales in 1979. The legislation at that time 
provided that if fewer than 40% of the total electorate voted Yes in the referendum then the 
measure would not pass. The result in the Scottish process was 51.6% support for the 
proposal, but with a turnout of 64% this represented only 32.9% of those registered to vote. 
The measure therefore failed and became a source of political grievance among nationalists 
during the 1980s and 1990s. Thus when the Labour Party came into government in 1997 with 
a fresh set of devolution proposals, the super-majority issue was not raised again and 
subsequent referendums held in 1998 in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland on varying 
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models of devolved government were passed by simple majority. Nor was there any threshold 
rule for the national referendums on continuing membership of the European Communities in 
1975 or on the electoral system in 2011. Therefore, it is perhaps not surprising that this was 
never seriously discussed as an issue in relation to the independence referendum. And yet, to 
a Canadian audience it may well seem odd that the UK Government agreed to a process 
which could have, in effect, broken up the country by way of one simple majority vote. 
This was of course a concern for the Supreme Court of Canada in the Secession Reference, 
where one of the constitutional principles to which it referred was ‘respect for minority 
rights’.44 And in the Reference the court made clear that the interests of minorities would be 
very important to the constitutional permissibility of any secession process.45 
The contrast with the UK does not appear to be mainly one of constitutional principle, but 
rather a consequence of very different demographics. Quebec is a francophone province but 
one that is home to a long-established Anglophone minority and many indigenous peoples. It 
is in defending the interests of these people that the Secession Reference seems primarily to 
be concerned, rather than the more general minority of voters who might find themselves on 
the losing side. Scotland, by contrast, does not have territorial minorities in the same sense. 
There are of course cultural minorities, immigrants and their descendants, but such groups 
can be distinguished from territorial minorities, particularly because they sought to assimilate 
into Scottish society as they have in Canada and Quebec, and have generally been successful 
in doing so.46 That said, there is also a divergence on the point of constitutional principle as 
to whether or not fundamental constitutional decisions should be made by way of simple 
majority. This is less of an issue in the UK where Parliament can change the constitution by 
way of ordinary legislation. But it is no surprise that a ‘supermajority’ argument emerged in 
relation to the Quebec referendum in a country where widespread provincial consent is 
needed for constitutional change. It should however be borne in mind that, according to the 
Supreme Court of Canada, a Yes vote to secession in Quebec would still require a 
constitutional amendment to effect secession, and to this end it seems that unanimous 
provincial consent to the outcome of the negotiation process would be needed, thereby 
introducing the need for very wide pan-Canadian agreement to a secessionist event.  
Clear Question: Arrived at by Agreement 
Another significant issue in both Canadian referendums was the nature of the question. The 
questions asked in both 1980 and 1995 were considered by the federal government to be at 
best obscure and at worst misleading, encouraging people to think that they were voting for 
an outcome, association47 or partnership48 with Canada, when in fact they were voting for 
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independent statehood which would carry no guarantee of any such future relationship with 
Canada. By contrast, in the Scottish referendum, although for a time it did appear that the 
question would be a source of disagreement, a broad consensus was arrived at over the nature 
and wording of the issue to be put to voters. There are various reasons for this: the 
preparedness of both sides to enter into the Edinburgh Agreement in which each traded gains 
and losses, the existence within UK law of a detailed system of independent oversight of 
referendums which enjoys legitimacy throughout the UK, and the political calculation of the 
Scottish Government that it was better to ask a short, clear question which would allow it to 
focus on the substantive content of the independence proposal. 
For over a decade UK referendums have operated on the basis of a dedicated referendum law 
– the Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act 2000 (PPERA)49 PPERA is a very 
detailed statute covering many aspects of electoral law. One innovation in the 2000 Act was 
the creation of an independent Electoral Commission, vested with a detailed oversight role in 
UK referendums, including the duty to assess and comment upon the ‘intelligibility’ of 
proposed referendum questions.50 Notably the Electoral Commission goes about this task by 
convening focus groups etc. to test the question empirically, assessing how well it is 
understood by people etc.51  
One outcome of the Edinburgh Agreement was the extension of the PPERA rules to the 
Scottish process.52 This applied not simply to the question but to a range of other important 
process issues including information to the voters, advertising, the franchise for the 
referendum etc. In this way the existing UK legal regime acted as a benchmark for the 
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Scottish Government in drafting the legislation which would eventually provide the legal 
basis for the referendum: the Scottish Independence Referendum (Franchise) Act 2013 (‘the 
Scottish Franchise Act’), and the Scottish Independence Referendum Act (‘the Scottish 
Referendum Act’) 2013.  
In relation to the question itself, the Edinburgh Agreement also provided:  
‘Both governments agree that the referendum question must be fair, easy to 
understand and capable of producing a result that is accepted and commands 
confidence.’53  
The Electoral Commission took on its usual role.54 The Scottish Government sent its 
proposed question for ‘intelligibility’ review by the Electoral Commission. The initial 
formulation was: ‘Do you agree that Scotland should be an independent country? Yes/No’. 
The Electoral Commission took the view that  
‘based on our research and taking into account what we heard from people and 
organisations who submitted their views on the question, we consider that the 
proposed question is not neutral because the phrase ‘Do you agree …?’ could lead 
people towards voting ‘yes’.’  
It therefore recommended the following alternative question: ‘Should Scotland be an 
independent country? Yes/No’.’55 This was accepted by the Scottish Government and this 
was the question included in the Scottish Independence Referendum Act,56 and ultimately put 
to the voters. 
The contrast with the two Quebec referendums is clear. In neither 1980 nor 1995 was there a 
federal regime of referendum regulation which could have applied to the process, and nor 
was there any agreement on oversight by a mutually acceptable independent national 
regulator who would have the role of reviewing the wording of the question or of regulating 
and overseeing the fairness of the process more broadly. One advantage of the Edinburgh 
Agreement process is that it also serves to legitimise the referendum outcome. In the 
Scotland/UK process the quid pro quo to the Scottish Government’s acceptance of this 
regulatory model was a concession that the UK Government would accept the result of the 
referendum. The Agreement ended with this paragraph on cooperation: 
‘The United Kingdom and Scottish Governments are committed, through the 
Memorandum of Understanding between them and others, to working together on 
matters of mutual interest and to the principles of good communication and mutual 
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respect. The two governments have reached this agreement in that spirit. They look 
forward to a referendum that is legal and fair producing a decisive and respected 
outcome. The two governments are committed to continue to work together 
constructively in the light of the outcome, whatever it is, in the best interests of the 
people of Scotland and of the rest of the United Kingdom.’57 
Again this stage was never reached in Canada in either 1980 or in 1995, a point made clear 
by the circumstances surrounding the Secession Reference itself, the very premise of which 
was the federal government’s refusal to countenance Quebec’s right to secede. 
In the end the independence referendum in Scotland passed off smoothly with no disputes 
over any of the key process issues, including the funding and spending rules which were also 
established by the Edinburgh Agreement.58  
The upshot was that both sides in the referendum campaign, and therefore citizens 
themselves, were able to focus upon the substantive issues at stake without being distracted 
by whether or not the referendum was lawful or whether the UK Government would accept 
the result of a majority Yes vote. This was fundamentally important to the process and a key 
condition which allowed the Scottish process to be seen as a genuine moment of citizen 
deliberation. 
The Scottish referendum has indeed been lauded on this basis.59 The turnout of 84.65% was 
the highest for any UK electoral event since the introduction of universal suffrage, and 
compares very well to the 65.1% who voted in the 2010 UK general election and the 50.6% 
who turned out for the 2011 Scottish parliamentary elections. Another feature of the 
referendum was that the Scottish Parliament extended the franchise to those aged 16 and 17.60 
This was a radical departure; never before have people under the age of 18 been entitled to 
vote in a major British election or referendum.61 This makes the turnout even more 
remarkable when we consider the significant logistical task involved in registering new voters 
and in mobilising so many young people to engage with an electoral campaign for the first 
time.62 
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But turnout is only part of the picture. Evidence has emerged of the extent to which people 
sought out information about the issue at stake and engaged vociferously with one another at 
home, in the workplace and other public spaces, and, to an unprecedented degree in British 
politics, on social media.63  
Despite the degree of popular participation in the Scottish process, t is still notable that while 
citizens played a full role in the referendum campaign itself and voted in high numbers, their 
role prior to this was largely passive. The decision to hold a referendum was taken by the 
Scottish Government, while the Edinburgh Agreement determined that the referendum could 
be held only on the issue of independence and not on any other model of constitutional 
change.   
This raises a serious democratic concern about the overall process. In the course of 2012 it 
became clear that a substantial majority of citizens in Scotland were in favour of 
constitutional change, but not of full independence. The Scottish Government tapped into this 
sentiment and revived an earlier suggestion of a third option on the ballot – some formulation 
of further devolution.64 The United Kingdom government reacted strongly to this. Its key 
political goal in consenting to the Edinburgh Agreement was to ensure that the referendum 
would contain only two options – independence and the status quo – since it was confident 
that it could defeat the independence proposal. To that end the Agreement, while enabling the 
Scottish Parliament to legislate for a referendum, made clear that it could do so only ‘with 
one question on independence’.65 While the Edinburgh Agreement was a positive step in 
avoiding hostility between the two campaigns over the process, it was also an elite deal which 
constrained the options which were presented to voters. In short, it was a trade-off between 
the political goals of the SNP on the one hand – to acquire the legal authority to manage the 
process rules - and, on the other hand, a political calculation made by the UK government 
that it could win a referendum on independence but would probably lose a referendum which 
promised more – and potentially open-ended - powers to the Scottish Parliament.  
What was missing from the referendum design process, therefore, was a step which would 
ensure that citizens were in fact able to vote for the most popular constitutional option. This 
is not to single out the Scottish referendum as particularly deficient. The typical story of 
referendums is one in which elites are able to set the agenda. The process rules, the length of 
a campaign, and the question that is set are typically in the hands of the executive, albeit 
subject to parliamentary approval; constitutionally guaranteed opportunities for citizens or 
other deliberative bodies to influence the process are invariably lacking.  
4. Popular Deliberation: Canada’s Experience of Citizens’ Assemblies 
There are therefore further lessons which can be learned about the use of the referendum in 
processes of constitutional change, in particular how best to give ordinary citizens a 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Scottish Parliament elections:  Scotland Act 1998 (Modification of Schedules 4 and 5 and Transfer of Functions 
to the Scottish Ministers etc.) Order 2015.   
63 https://www.aqmen.ac.uk/project/socialmedia; and Ailsa Henderson, Liam Delaney and Robert Liñeira, ‘Risk 
and Attitudes to Constitutional Change’, ESRC Scottish Centre on Constitutional Change Risk and 
Constitutional Attitudes Survey, 16 August 2014. 
64 Scotland’s Future: Draft Referendum (Scotland) Bill Consultation Paper, 2010. 
65 Agreement between the United Kingdom Government and the Scottish Government on a referendum on 
independence for Scotland, para 6. 
Reprinted with permission
meaningful role, both as a way of overcoming the elite control syndrome which we saw in 
relation to both the Scottish referendum (where elite control was at least dispersed between 
the two governments) and the Quebec referendums in 1980 and 1995 where the processes 
were organised by the Quebec government or, in the 1995 process, by an alliance of Quebec 
nationalist parties,66 and as a way of surmounting the deliberation deficit. For these lessons it 
is instructive to return again to Canada. 
The idea of deliberative democracy is something of a recent turn in democratic theory, to 
some extent traceable to the work of John Rawls in the early ‘70s67 but given a sustained 
push in the past 10-15 years in a number of directions, particularly among those who want to 
see a greater role for the citizen in democratic decision-making. The work on deliberative 
democracy is by now a broad church and there are many areas of disagreement among 
theorists as to the key values of deliberative democracy.68 But a common commitment is that 
political decisions should be preceded by ‘authentic deliberation’, or what John Rawls calls 
‘public reason’.69 By this principle people engaged in making decisions should reflect 
authentically and honestly before they do so and should engage publicly with others, prepared 
to defend their views and open to be persuaded by the arguments of others. This has led to a 
move to combine this approach with popular participation, seeking ways to engage citizens in 
constitution-making processes, and finding avenues whereby citizens can engage openly and 
deliberatively in a meaningful context.70 One way to do this is in the process leading to a 
referendum. The referendum is of course itself the archetypal forum for citizen participation, 
but a key goal has to be to maximise the deliberative quality of that engagement. 
The experiments in direct democracy undertaken at the provincial level in Canada in the 
2000s, although not without their flaws, are potentially very important as templates for 
citizen engagement at the issue-framing and question-setting stages of a referendum process: 
replacing political elites with citizens, and facilitating a process by which these citizens make 
decisions which is open, informed and deliberative. In particular, the British Columbia 
Citizens Assembly on Electoral Reform (BCCA) in 2004 was a highly innovative citizen-led 
process which resulted in a referendum on electoral reform held in 2005. The Assembly was 
comprised only of ordinary citizens who had a controlling role in determining both how the 
issue of electoral reform ought to be put to voters and setting the very question itself: ‘Should 
British Columbia change to the BC-STV electoral system as recommended by the Citizens' 
Assembly on Electoral Reform?’71 This model was repeated in Ontario,72 and although its 
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problems have been well documented,73 it offers an example for other countries in how 
ordinary citizens can be offered a pivotal role not only in voting upon, but also in in setting 
the terms for, constitutional change.  
The BCCA deliberated throughout most of 2004. It was composed of ordinary citizens ‘in 
order to avoid electioneering and politicizing of the Assembly.’74 Members were chosen 
randomly from the voter roll which thereby avoided self-selection by particularly keen 
citizens. Despite an initial proposal of one member from each riding, at the recommendation 
of the chair of the Committee this was doubled to ensure gender equality, leading to 158 
rather than 79 members, supplemented by two members from aboriginal communities to give 
a total of 160.75  
The remit of the BCCA was to assess models for electing Members of the Legislative 
Assembly of BC and to issue a report recommending whether the current model should be 
retained or another model adopted, this issue to be put to the people of the province in a 
referendum. The Assembly’s work took place in three phases. First, an educational phase 
every second weekend for two months to March 2004, where the Assembly learned about 
different models of electoral system with case studies from around the world. This lead to a 
‘preliminary statement’ – a form of interim report - to the people of British Columbia. The 
next two months were taken up with public hearings, this time on rotation across the 
province, to take the views of diverse groups. In this way an opportunity was given to the 
broader public to participate and be heard. Following a Summer break, the BCCA 
reconvened for three months from September to November for a final period of deliberation 
ending with a final report issued in December 2004. 
It is clear that the BC model marks a high water mark for relatively unmediated popular 
power in micro-level decision-making.76 But there are at least two question marks concerning 
process design. The first is that the BCCA was focused very much upon the micro-level, 
issue-forming and question-framing stage without devoting a lot of effort to engaging with 
the public more broadly concerning their interest in, and preferences for, electoral reform. For 
all the energy put into the micro process of the BCCA, there was far less success in fostering 
deliberation when the process moved to the referendum campaign.77 Ian Ward cites one poll 
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carried out the February before the May referendum where ‘only half … of British 
Columbians say they [had] read, seen or heard anything about the British Columbia Citizens’ 
Assembly on Electoral Reform’78 and shortly before the referendum nearly two-thirds of 
British Columbians still knew ‘very little’ (39%) or ‘nothing’ (25%) about the electoral 
system being proposed.79 It seems that in this process and in the similar one in Ontario in 
2007,80 far more energy and resources were expended on the small group process than in 
providing information, education and in fostering deliberation across the citizenry as a 
whole.81 Ward concludes that this ‘is a gap which will need to be closed if indeed citizens’ 
assemblies are to be used in the future to counter the democratic deficit.’82 
A second question mark concerns the political realism of a process that is entirely in the 
hands of randomly selected citizens. It is important not to forget that direct democracy and 
active citizen participation do not take place in a vacuum but in close symbiosis with 
institutions of representative democracy, and that it can be argued that any micro-process 
should properly have a representative element if it is to meet the goal of allowing those 
affected by a decision to have a say in making it. Arguably, the absence of the main political 
parties from the process was unwise since they are crucial stakeholders in any decision about 
electoral reform. 
In light of this the exclusive role offered to citizens is perhaps unrealistic. The decision of the 
BCCA was of course final and the alternative model of electoral reform it produced – the 
single transferable vote - was one which the government was obliged to put to a referendum. 
This proposed a very radical form of change compared to the ‘alternative vote’ model 
favoured by many in the political classes. The focus of much of the deliberations of the 
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Assembly was upon the impact of different systems on groups defined by gender, ethnicity 
and culture, and much less upon how they would affect political parties and in turn the 
political system itself, as well as class-based interests around which party systems have 
tended to evolve. There are therefore serious questions to be asked about excluding party 
voices and interests from an issue that is so central to electoral politics in a representative 
system.83 In  short, a commitment to popular participation in constitutional decision-making 
is not necessarily a commitment to exclusively popular models of decision-making. 
The BCCA and` Ontario Citizens’ Assembly model may have flaws but they did constitute a 
serious engagement with citizens. This contrasts sharply with the referendum on electoral 
reform held in the UK in 2011 which clearly failed the deliberative test. In terms of elite 
control the decision to hold the AV referendum was a bargain born of political expediency. It 
was in effect a bargaining chip offered by the Conservative Party to the Liberal Democrats 
(who favoured a move to some form of proportional representation) in 2010 as part of the 
deal which formed the coalition government. The model offered was a very modest form of 
electoral reform which therefore partly appeased Conservative MPs who were mostly 
opposed to such change. The process came in for criticism from a number of people giving 
evidence to a House of Lords inquiry on referendums both for the unsuitability of the model 
to be presented in the referendum and for the process by which it was arrived at.84 The 
consequence was that citizens or indeed broader civil society had no say in either issue 
framing or question formation. 
It is no surprise therefore that it was very difficult to mobilise much public interest in the 
process. It is clear from the turnout and result in 2011 that many people did not view the AV 
proposition as an important issue (turnout of 42.2 per cent; 68 per cent voted No and 32 per 
cent voted Yes). But even the far more deliberative process of British Columbia and Ontario, 
where we also saw a lack of wider public engagement, suggests that this is a broader problem 
for referendums on electoral reform.85 It is clearly the case that this issue stimulates far less 
citizen interest than does secession.  
This raises the question of when it is appropriate to use referendums at all as part of the 
constitutional amendment process. If an elite has complete discretion as to the types of issue 
to put to a referendum and when to do so, then it may well be that the people will be led into 
a referendum which many of them don’t want or don’t see the point of. This highlights how 
regulation of the different components of a referendum process need to be linked together; no 
matter how well regulated the procedural components are, if the referendum topic itself is an 
irrelevance to many citizens then meaningful deliberation across the polity is scarcely 
possible. One of the recommendations of the House of Lords inquiry was that there should be 
                                                          
83 This has caused commentators to ask whether the final model which might be characterised as ‘anti-party’ 
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legal regulation of the types of issue that should be subject of referendums and how and when 
issues might be brought before the people.86 
  
Conclusion 
In many ways the United Kingdom method of constitutional change through parliamentary 
legislation has, over the past twenty years, been advantageous. It allowed devolution to be 
created quickly in 1998 and for this to be done in incremental and heavily asymmetrical ways 
for each of the three devolved territories, without the need for an over-arching constitutional 
settlement for which there was little political appetite. In other words, devolution was 
achievable, meeting the specific needs and desires of each of the territories without 
abandoning Britain’s unwritten constitution and without juridifying a political constitution 
which has worked well for centuries. Furthermore, the flexibility in the system has allowed 
for further constitutional change from time to time, responding to evolving demands or 
correcting what seem to be anomalies or outdated features of devolution.  
But a disadvantage in the system is that there are ultimately no procedural checks. The UK 
Government can initiate any constitutional change it wishes and it can do so by any 
procedure; in practice Parliament can become little more than a rubber-stamp. Canada itself is 
of course no stranger to elite-driven processes of constitutional change. Following the 
patriation of the constitution the country embarked upon a tortuous period which led to the 
Meech Lake Accord and the draft Charlottetown process, each of which resulted in failure. 
The outcome was constitutional stasis and a general popular disenchantment with the 
constitutional amendment process. Arguably it was the very failure of the these processes, 
and of the amendment process which requires such a high threshold of provincial consent, 
which created the conditions for the 1995 referendum itself.  
What Meech Lake and Charlottetown did have in their favour however was the emergence of 
a genuinely national conversation, taking account of the interests of all of the provinces and 
of the people within them in all their diversity. There may not have been final agreement but 
there is something to be said for a process which takes place over a long period of time and 
requires broad agreement across the country. As Peter Hogg says about the failed 
Charlottetown referendum: 
‘no amount of public consultation guarantees the success of proposals to amend the 
Constitution. However, it is probably safe to say that an absence of public consolation 
does guarantee failure.’87 
Into this mix the referendum has emerged as an important player in constitutional change in 
both countries, and given the ad hoc nature of the referendum it is hard to predict what its 
role may be in the future. Notably the Charlottetown agreement required to be ratified by 
referendum, a decision which was taken largely because citizens felt so excluded from the 
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Meech Lake deliberations. One imagines that any similar pan-Canadian attempt radically to 
reform the constitution would also require the final endorsement of the people speaking 
directly.  
The referendum is also a growing feature of constitutional change in the UK as Table 2 
(Appendix 2) shows, and not only in relation to Scotland. The Government of Wales Act 
2006 confirmed the need for a referendum on further devolution for Wales, resulting in a 
referendum in 2011,88 and the Wales Act 2014 also provides for a referendum on whether its 
income tax provisions ought to come into force.89 Similarly, the Northern Ireland Act 1998 
confirms that ‘Northern Ireland in its entirety remains part of the United Kingdom and shall 
not cease to be so without the consent of a majority of the people of Northern Ireland’ voting 
in a referendum.90 At the national level, the UK held only its second national referendum on 
electoral reform in 2011, while another important initiative is the European Union Act 2011 
which requires that a referendum be held on any significant amendments to the EU treaties.91 
The United Kingdom is also set for a  referendum on membership of the European Union 
following the 2015 general election.92 
But the referendum by itself does not guarantee a significant popular role beyond an 
opportunity to reflect upon and discuss the issue during the campaign, and of course the 
important power to vote for or against the proposition put to voters. In particular, it does not 
guarantee citizens a role in formulating the issue upon which they are to decide. It seems, 
therefore, that the way forward, from the perspective of deliberative popular democracy, is to 
try to build structures of popular participation into the constitutional amendment process in a 
more thorough way. In this light the citizens’ assemblies initiatives in British Columbia and 
Ontario are instructive. Although they failed to translate the enthusiasm of the small group to 
the level of full macro-engagement of citizens, this may be down in no small part to the lack 
of interest voters often show in the issue of electoral reform. The UK referendum in 2011 
also had a very low turnout on this issue. By contrast, the Scottish referendum and the 1995 
referendum in Quebec show just how mobilised people can be when confronted with an issue 
that is of great significance to their lives. And it is surely the case that each of these 
referendums, on the massive issue of secession, would have benefitted from pre-referendum 
processes, similar to the citizens assemblies of BC and Ontario, which sought to determine 
what the constitutional preferences of people were, so that this could feed in meaningfully to 
the framing of the question. It seems clear from polls taken in Scotland from 2012-14 that 
this may well have led to a very different question in Scotland than the question on 
independence with which people were faced. Perhaps the two lessons we can take from 
merging the experiences of both countries is that referendums are best preserved for major 
constitutional issues in which the public is genuinely engaged, but that these should be 
preceded by a popular role in issue-framing and an ongoing attempt to maintain popular 
engagement at the micro-level throughout the referendum campaign.  
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The constitutions of Canada and the United Kingdom are very different, particularly since 
1982 when Canada acquired a detailed and formalised amending formula that is so different 
from the process of ordinary legislation that is used to bring about constitutional change in 
Britain. However, it is also the case that each country has faced similar challenges in the rise 
of the referendum as a feature of constitutional politics – namely how to manage direct 
democracy within a parliamentary system which is modelled upon representative 
government, and how to fit the referendum into established patterns and procedures of 
constitutional amendment. If the referendum is set to remain a significant player in both 
Canada and the UK it seems that in different ways each country has much to learn from the 
other on how best to use direct democracy to effect constitutional change that is legitimate, 
democratic and meaningful to citizens.  
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Appendix 1 
Referendums in Canada 
Place Date Issue Result 
Canada 29 September 
1898 
Prohibition of alcohol Approved: 51.2 
Canada 27 April 1942 Conscription Approved: 64.5 
Canada 26 October 1992 Constitutional renewal 
(Charlottetown Accord) 
Not approved: 
54.3  
Quebec April 10 1919 Legalization of sale of 
alcohol 
Approved: 78.62 
Quebec 20 May 1980 Sovereignty Association Not approved: 
59.6 
Quebec 30 October 1995 Sovereignty and 
Partnership 
Not approved: 
50.6  
Ontario 
 
23 October 1924 Continuation of 
prohibition statute 
Limited sale of alcohol 
Approved: 51.5 
 
Not approved: 
51.5 
Ontario 10 October 2007 Electoral Reform Not approved: 63 
Newfoundland 3 June 1948 Constitutional Status Inconclusive: 
44.6% for 
restoration of 
dominion status, 
41.1% for 
confederation 
with Canada, 
14.3% for 
continuing the 
Commission of 
Government 
Newfoundland 22 July 1948 Confederation Approved: 52.3 
Newfoundland 
and Labrador 
 5 September 
1995 
Non-Denominational 
School System 
Approved: 54.4 
Newfoundland 
and Labrador 
2 September 
1997 
Non-Denominational 
Schools 
Approved: 73 
New 14 May 2001 Retain Video Lottery Approved: 53.1 
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Brunswick Terminals 
Nova Scotia  October 16 2004 Allow Sunday shopping Not approved: 
54.9 
British 
Columbia  
August 30, 1972 Time settings Not Approved: 
63.4 
British 
Columbia 
October 17, 1991 Recall of elected 
officials 
Introduction of Initiative 
Referendum 
Recall approved 
80.9 
Initiative 
approved 83 
British 
Columbia 
(postal 
referendum) 
15 May 2002 First Nations Treaty 
Rights 
Over 80% 
approval on the 
eight principles 
asked about 
British 
Columbia 
17 May 2005 Electoral Reform Not approved: 
support of 57% of 
voters but failed 
to meet 
‘supermajority’ 
threshold of 60% 
British 
Columbia 
12 May 2009 Electoral Reform Not approved: 
60.9% 
British 
Columbia 
13 June – 5 
August 2011 
(postal 
referendum) 
Sales Tax 
discontinuation 
Approved: 55 
Prince Edward 
Island 
January 18, 1988 Confederation Bridge Approved: 59.4 in 
favour of the 
fixed link 
Prince Edward 
Island 
28 November 
2005 
Electoral Reform Not approved: 64   
Northwest 
Territories 
April 14, 1982 division plebiscite Approved: 56.48 
% 
Northwest 
Territories 
4 May 1992 Jurisdictional boundaries  Approved: 54 
Alberta  August 17, 1948 Electrification plebiscite 
The ballot offered two 
options on electricity 
regulation, asking if the 
province should create a 
Crown corporation to manage 
Option A: 
Approved 50.03% 
Option B: Not 
approved 49.97% 
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electricity, or leave the 
electricity industry in the 
hands of the companies 
currently in the business. 
Alberta  
 
May 23, 1967 Daylight Saving Time 
plebiscite 
Not approved: 
51.25 
Alberta  August 30, 1971  Daylight Saving Time Approved:  61.5 
Nunavut  11 December 
1995 
Nunavut capital  Approved: 60 
Nunavut 26 May 1997 Equal representation  Not approved: 
57.4  
Table 193 
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Appendix 2 
Referendums in the United Kingdom 
Place Date Issue Result 
Northern 
Ireland 
8 March 1973 Remain part of the UK  
 
Approved: 98.9 
Northern 
Ireland 
22 May 1998 Belfast Agreement Approved: 71.1 
Scotland 1 March 1979 Creation of a Scottish 
Assembly  
Approved: 52 
(did not meet 
threshold) 
Wales 1 March 1979 Creation of a Welsh 
Assembly 
Not approved: 
79.7 
Scotland 11 September 
1997 
1. Creation of a Scottish 
Parliament. 
2. Devolution of limited 
tax-varying powers 
1. Approved: 74.3 
2. Approved: 63.5 
Scotland 18 September 
2015  
Independence Not Approved: 
55.3 
Wales 18 September 
1997 
Creation of a National 
Assembly 
Approved: 50.3 
England 
(London) 
7 May 1998 GLA and Mayor  Approved: 72 
England 
(North East) 
4 November 
2004 
North East England 
regional assembly 
Not approved: 78 
Wales 3 March 2011 Devolution of further 
powers to the National 
Assembly 
Approved: 63.5 
Scotland 18 September 
2014 
Independence Not approved: 
55.3 
United 
Kingdom 
5 June 1975 Continued EC 
membership 
Approved: 67.2 
United 
Kingdom 
5 May 2011 Electoral System: 
Alternative Vote 
Not approved: 
67.9 
Table 2 
 
Reprinted with permission
